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supermajor, ExxonMobil, and its business in 
the unconventional gas field in Europe. The 
purpose was to investigate whether and how 
ExxonMobil runs its natural gas operations dif-
ferently among European countries and possi-
ble reasons for divergent strategies. After a 
brief introduction of the firm, ExxonMobil’s ap-
proach in Europe in general will be discussed. 
Two countries are in focus: Poland and Ger-
many. The key finding is that the firm indeed has 
shown different approaches and strategies. In 
Poland, ExxonMobil faced a supportive, positive environment but 
quit quickly when its small investment resulted only in disappoint-
ing results. The firm, however, was a newcomer which had not 
much to lose. In contrast, its German unconventional gas opera-
tions are connected to broad conventional activities and are being 
defended by an extensive effort to win back public support.   
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Introduction 
ExxonMobil, an American multinational corporation, is one of 
the most active companies in the field of unconventional gas ex-
ploration in Europe. The firm has pursued the new resource in 
multiple European countries in recent years, but it has also made 
surprising exits. The most prominent investments for this com-
pany were placed in Poland and Germany.  
When ExxonMobil ran test wells in 2011 in Poland but then quit 
the country in 2012, it sent a disturbing message to investors, op-
erators and energy policymakers in Poland, a country both rich in 
shale gas reserves and very supportive of shale gas development. 
By contrast, the firm has dug in its heels in Germany, which has 
much less shale gas to offer, a difficult regulatory environment and 
strong political opposition. When Germans turned hostile, the firm 
committed to fighting for public acceptance. 
In Germany, ExxonMobil began exploration in 2008 but was 
forced to stop. Interestingly, ExxonMobil has proclaimed that 
“Germany (is) more likely to be the first shale gas producer” in 
comparison to Poland (Bergin, 2012). Poland and Germany are 
quite different in the way they pose challenges to ExxonMobil’s 
business, and the firm has responded in different ways.  
The Company  
ExxonMobil Corporation, headquartered in Texas, is the largest 
publicly traded oil and gas producing company of the world; this 
“supermajor” in 2012 was ranked third in the Global Fortune 500 
list (ExxonMobil, n.d.-a; Fortune, 2013). The company holds a 
great number of mining rights and resources around the world.  
The firm has its roots in the legendary Standard Oil Trust which 
was broken up by a U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1911. Among 
the many legacy companies coming out of this split were two 
which, after some name changes, became Exxon and Mobil. In 
their early years, they focused on oil production and refining but 
by the 1950s expanded into the chemical industry (Vassiliou, 
2009, p. XXXI). A change in U.S. antitrust law allowed the com-
panies to merge in 1999. Today, ExxonMobil is a globally active 
multinational with many joint ventures (ExxonMobil, n.d.-b).    
ExxonMobil has a century-long history in Europe, too, with 
Esso and Mobil being well-known consumer brands. Across Eu-
rope, the firm runs a broad upstream (exploration, production), 
downstream (refining, marketing, service stations), and chemical 
manufacturing business. Growth in demand for oil and gas prod-
ucts, together with continuously rising prices, has helped the firm 
expand enormously.  
ExxonMobil became one of the leaders of the private oil indus-
try, together with Chevron (USA), Royal Dutch Shell (UK/Neth-
erlands), BP (UK), ConocoPhillips (USA) and Total (France). In 
the past decades, these corporations have faced stiff competition 
from state-owned firms such as Saudi Aramco, China’s CNPC, 
Russian Rosneft, Iran’s NIOC, PDVSA from Venezuela, Brazil’s 
Petrobras and Malaysia’s Petronas. In order to keep its leading po-
sition, ExxonMobil invests in finding new ways to reach and ex-
ploit resources. Deep water exploration is one path, as is uncon-
ventional gas.  
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ExxonMobil is a classic oil “supermajor,” but it has long moved 
into the natural gas business. In fact, today the firm produces as 
much gas as it produces oil (O'Keefe, 2012). It was, however, not 
among the pioneers of the unconventional gas players in North 
America, which were all smaller, independent firms that experi-
mented with new methods. They did what the large companies did 
not dare to do because it seemed too difficult, too labor-intensive, 
and financially too expensive. As is now well known, only when 
they showed spectacular success, the big oil companies began to 
pay attention. By the mid-2000s, they began to realize the potential 
of the shale gas market. 
So, like other major oil companies, ExxonMobil arrived late to 
the scene. It was through the 2010 takeover of XTO Energy, a spe-
cialized unconventionals firm and the largest gas producer (con-
ventional and unconventional), that ExxonMobil firmly estab-
lished itself as a natural gas major. The XTO buy was very con-
troversial among ExxonMobil’s shareholders and actually pushed 
Exxon’s stock prices down, since fast profits were unsure; Exx-
onMobil’s top management tried to explain that it was a new long-
term investment and that the company had the financial resilience 
to do so: “We can be patient” (O’Keefe, 2012). Nevertheless, other 
big oil companies also bought unconventional gas producers, thus 
changing the commercial landscape, and introducing different ap-
proaches to the science, technology, and management of uncon-
ventional gas production.  
ExxonMobil’s acquisition of XTO Energy has been interpreted 
by some as a “dramatic shift in strategy,” reshaping the firm; but 
others point to continuity in the firm’s strategy to look for new 
horizons and a new project mix in the face of shrinking opportu-
nities to replace oil reserves; even before the XTO acquisition, 
ExxonMobil had considerable investment in gas and other uncon-
ventional resources, such as Canadian oil sands, as well as world-
wide facilities to produce and export liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
(Aeberman, 2012). It may also be said that the firm is increasingly 
wary of business risks in the international arena and is undergoing 
a “transformation from an integrated oil company to a capital and 
service provider,” which means that it moves away from the tradi-
tional model of production and distribution and towards services 
like building plants and processing, adding value by providing 
capital and efficiency for external customers (Aeberman, 2012).  
Globally, ExxonMobil is one of the most well-known firms. It 
is also one of the most criticized for a number of reasons, but cer-
tainly as a symbol for undue influence and power of multinational 
corporations, and as a symbol for pollution and climate-threaten-
ing business. The firm is a familiar enemy and target for the eco-
logically minded: “ExxonMobil is the environmental movement’s 
antichrist” (Mower, 2010). Going into unconventional gas has in-
creased the company’s exposure to harsh criticism over the “frack-
ing” technology, both in the U.S. and abroad, particularly in Eu-
rope. The firm, like others in the industry, has been reproached for 
denying environmental and health risks, and continuing to invest 
in fossil fuels rather than to contribute to a climate-friendly 
buildup of renewable energy and a low-carbon economy. 
Thus, the firm makes a considerable effort to protect its reputa-
tion from attacks, invests in Corporate Social Responsibility pro-
jects, and commits to broad public communication about its value 
to economies and societies in the countries where ExxonMobil is 
active.  
The firm’s CEO, Rex Tillerson, offers a defensive and even 
somewhat laid-back attitude to public criticism over ExxonMo-
bil’s pursuit of new energy resources and methods. “We go 
through this every time we go to a new area to develop,” he says, 
“it's just part of how society deals with having their energy needs 
met.” He criticizes the attitude to avoid any risk because a constant 
governance by precautionary principle would undermine the econ-
omy: “If you want to live by the precautionary principle, then 
crawl up in a ball and live in a cave” (O’Keefe, 2012). He adds 
that in his view, his firm is actually more popular abroad than at 
home:  
What I find interesting about the U.S. relative to other countries is in 
most every other country where we operate, people really like us. 
And they’re really glad we’re there. And governments really like us. 
And it's not just ExxonMobil. They admire our industry because of 
what we can do. They almost are in awe of what we’re able to do. 
And in this country [USA], you can flip it around 180 degrees. I don't 
understand why that is, but it just is. (O’Keefe, 2012) 
A mainstream view from Europe may not quite match Tillerson’s 
perception. There is no lack of hostility towards ExxonMobil, and 
its unconventional gas engagement has increased rather than de-
creased the difficulties business strategy has to deal with. 
ExxonMobil in Europe 
Energy markets and political contexts vary across Europe. The 
potential for unconventional gas exploration also varies because 
geology and technical conditions are different, and some European 
countries have no sizable deposits of shale gas or other unconven-
tionals. In general, ExxonMobil portrays itself as “one of Europe´s 
largest oil and gas producers” and is “active in almost every Euro-
pean country” (ExxonMobil Corporation, n.d.-b), sporting re-
gional websites for nearly 20 European countries (Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, and the United Kingdom). But this does not mean that the 
company is doing business in unconventional gas everywhere. 
The firm has pursued this special business in Poland, Germany, 
Ukraine, Hungary and Turkey. However, for several reasons and 
factors, ExxonMobil has already quit activities in some countries, 
or no concrete investment decision has been communicated. In 
Hungary, ExxonMobil formed a joint venture with the Hungarian 
energy company Falcon Oil & Gas in 2008/09. But after disap-
pointing test results, Exxon left the partnership and stopped its 
tests (Brenner, 2009; NaturalGasEurope.com, 2012b). ExxonMo-
bil was reported in 2012 and 2013 to hold talks with Turkish Pe-
troleum Corporation (TPAO) for shale gas exploration in Turkey 
(Hürriyet Daily News, 2013). In Ukraine, ExxonMobil and the 
state-owned Naftogaz signed a deal in early 2011 to cooperate in 
development and exploration of shale gas reserves. Ukraine has 
the fourth-largest deposits of shale gas. Other big companies such 
as Shell, Chevron, Total, Eni and EdF have rushed to compete, 
which makes it difficult for Exxon to get the real pioneer role in 
this country. Nevertheless the company has the necessary re-
sources and funds to hold a solid position in Ukraine (n.a., 2011b; 
Reuters, 2011; Tuohy & Bulakh, 2013). Even though ExxonMo-
bil’s performance on the stock market had been rather poor com-
pared to the Dow Jones Industrial Average, it generated gains 
above 10% in 2013 (Caplinger, 2013) and its revenues and profits 
are among the highest in the world (see Global Fortune 500 list). 
ExxonMobil makes a Europe-wide effort to communicate on 
unconventional gas opportunities and industrial processes. Its 
Brussels office continuously participates in discussions and con-
sultations by the EU institutions, collaborating with industry asso-
ciations such as OGP, the International Oil and Gas Producers As-
sociation, representing upstream interests. Next to its corporate 
global and national websites, it has hired the Brussels-based public 
affairs agency Fleishman-Hillard to run, from 2011, a web plat-
form in English, German, French and Polish (europeunconven-
tionalgas.org, europaunkonventionelleserdgas.de, gaznonconven-
tionnelseurope.org, europagazniekonwencjonalny.pl). Probably 
because of this, the firm has not joined the younger cross-industry 
“Shale Gas Europe” initiative and web platform (shalegas-eu-
rope.eu), started in 2012 by London- and Brussels-based FTI Con-
sulting and supported by Chevron, Cuadrilla, Halliburton, Shell, 
Statoil and Total. Both web platforms are, however, quite similar 
Naumann & Philippi: ExxonMobil in Europe’s Shale Gas Fields 
 
JEMPAS   33 
 
in their positive promotion of unconventional gas and in their at-
tempt to refute negative arguments. 
Only in Germany, a country deeply skeptical of unconventional 
gas and “fracking” in particular, has ExxonMobil attempted to sof-
ten critical public opinion by a lengthy, elaborated and broadly 
publicized local stakeholder consultation process combined with 
extensive independent scientific work: the “Information and dia-
logue process of ExxonMobil about the safety and environmental 
impact of fracking technology for natural gas from unconventional 
sources” (Krüger, 2011; Schmitz, 2012).  
Poland: Testing and Quitting 
Poland is one of the few countries in Europe which has decid-
edly come out in favor of shale gas and tries to provide firms with 
a positive environment. The country wants to be a forerunner in 
the unconventional gas sector and is ready to activate stakeholders 
to deflect potential EU regulatory restrictions on the sector.  
When the European Commission, namely the Directorate-Gen-
eral for Environment, in 2013 started a public consultation, it re-
ceived most replies from Poland’s institutional, business and citi-
zen participants. In comparison, many other countries care a lot 
less (European Commission DG Environment, 2013, p. 2). 
Poland also showed the highest share of participants in the con-
sultations to be in favor of developing unconventional fossil fuels. 
Overall, Polish participants, by a 95 percent majority, basically 
said yes to unconventional gas in regard to this survey (European 
Commission DG Environment, 2013, p. 6). While these results 
should be taken with caution, and both European and domestic 
public opinion polls show a different picture, generally unconven-
tional gas has enjoyed relatively high support among elites and the 
public. 
After early studies showed that Poland could be among Eu-
rope’s lands with the largest shale gas capacity, the government 
started to attract many foreign companies to explore the potential 
(CNN.com, 2012; Strzeleck, 2013). Compared to Germany with 
its twelve exploration concessions, Poland with 109 concessions 
seemed to be on the right way, and general opinion towards “frack-
ing” was not as bad as in other European countries (Shale Gas Eu-
rope, 2013a, 2013b). 
Poland’s main strategic target is to gain higher independence 
from Russian gas imports. Furthermore, the country hopes that un-
conventional gas could improve the economic situation, state rev-
enues, and even enable the country to export gas while still diver-
sifying energy supply (Speak, 2013). Currently, Poland satisfies 
around 90 percent of its energy needs by coal (CNN.com, 2012). 
Nevertheless, a movement against the new technology has devel-
oped, especially among rural communities fearing for the farming 
business and the environment (MariCW, 2013). Since the move-
ment against is comparatively small in regard to other European 
countries, and a supportive environment for gas companies, Exx-
onMobil followed the Polish invitation (CNN.com, 2012). 
The reasons why Poland invited big companies like ExxonMo-
bil are obvious. Most of them have great experience in exploring 
the potential of unconventional gas fields. Furthermore they have 
the financial means to cope with the initial phase of such  new 
technology (Sreekumar, 2013). 
Exxon started with two test drillings in Poland in 2011. The re-
gions in which Exxon was able to get concessions are regarded as 
the most profitable. However, there was also strong competition 
during the first round of Polish concessions (Trefis Team, 2011). 
While ExxonMobil happily communicated with the media, 
which showed great interest in this major firm’s enterprises, it only 
offered limited opportunities for citizens to find information or 
participate. The company did set up a Polish-language version of 
its European website, europagazniekonwencjonalny.pl. 
But only one year later after tests had begun, ExxonMobil left 
the country after the company completed testing at two wells. The 
company sold the concessions to state-owned PKN Orlen and 
stated that it would pull out from Poland, ending all exploration 
(NaturalGasEurope.com, 2012a). There were multiple reasons for 
this step, although some media oversimplified them. Some observ-
ers saw a direct connection between resignation in Poland and a 
new deal in Russia, where the company could explore for tight oil 
in Siberia (NaturalGasEurope.com, 2012a). ExxonMobil itself 
justified the decision with unsatisfactory results from the test drill-
ings. These had shown that Polish shale gas is not brittle enough 
to reach commercially sufficient gas rates. The cost for producing 
gas would be too high and uncompetitive (NaturalGasEur-
ope.com, 2012b). The firm also said that it is in the belief that Ger-
many has better chances to become a shale gas producer than Po-
land. Part of this justification was existence of a better developed 
industry in Germany, whereas Poland is only at the beginning and 
the whole gas industry is completely new (Bergin, 2012; The 
Economist, 2013). One should also look to the fact that unconven-
tional gas prospects had been exaggerated and overdrawn. There 
is no doubt there is a certain amount which would mean high en-
ergy supply security for Poland. But the early estimates looked 
much more brilliant than the revised data later (Shale Gas Europe, 
2013b). This combined with difficulties to apply techniques and 
technology from the U.S. at Polish sites, and a limited professional 
service industry transferable to Polish shale gas; obviously the 
transatlantic transfer proved less easy than expected, and many ad-
justments have to be made (NaturalGasEurope.com, 2012a).  
Next to geological and technical problems, there were also pol-
icy problems. Regulations and laws for this new technology got 
stuck in the political process (Speak, 2013). In particular, uncer-
tainty about upcoming tax regulations may have Exxon to rethink: 
The government discussed plans to tax profits up to 40 percent 
(Sreekumar, 2013). Even withdrawal of these plans could not con-
vince Exxon to further explore shale gas in Poland. As other com-
panies quit Poland, the government decided to provide tax releases 
for shale gas exploring companies till 2020 (Speak, 2013). Exxon 
also stated that the existence of a mandatory partner like the Na-
tional Energy Minerals Operator (NOKE) would be uncomforta-
ble. This partner would act like a state-owned company that yields 
its profits to the state treasury (NaturalGasEurope.com, 2012c).  
In addition, the timeframe between acquiring a concession and 
getting the permission to drill was too long and sometimes too un-
certain for companies like Exxon. Some companies did not get the 
wanted or needed numbers of concessions, whereas others had the 
right number of concessions but did not get drilling licenses due 
to intransparent decisions (Sreekumar, 2013). 
Actions taken by the Polish government in order to keep as 
many investors as possible came too late for ExxonMobil. The 
government became more sensitive towards its policymaking pro-
cess. It has emphasized that businesses should not fear the regula-
tory framework, and that it hopes to convince companies that have 
left to come back (NaturalGasEurope.com, 2012c). Poland is 
against a regulation about unconventional gas on the EU level. The 
government argues that every country should handle laws and reg-
ulations on its own (Shale Gas Europe, 2013b).  
Germany: Holding on, Fighting  
Compared to Poland, the German energy market and system 
shows very different characteristics. Germany has a fairly diversi-
fied energy supply, but a major feature is a high degree of import 
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dependency well above EU average (Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Gaw-
likowska-Fyk & Westphal, 2013). As the largest EU member state 
with a very advanced industry, Germany also needs the most en-
ergy. The country, which historically is a large-volume gas user 
for industry purposes, heating, and recently also electricity gener-
ation, has a well-developed gas pipeline infrastructure. Still bound 
by long-term contracts, Germany imports high volumes of gas and 
oil from Russia, Norway, and the Netherlands (Ćwiek-Karpowicz 
et al., 2013). But Germany, which also has a long history of pro-
ducing its own gas (albeit not nearly enough to be self-sufficient), 
also counts among the countries in which sizeable unconventional 
deposits of natural gas have been identified. This has not led to 
enthusiasm at all, not even when the “Energiewende” debate made 
it clear that innovative replacements for outgoing nuclear plants 
have to be found, and that energy prices are expected to increase 
steeply – despite big investments in renewable energy production 
from photovoltaics to wind farms to biomass.  
German energy policymakers are indeed very skeptical and un-
decided in regard to “fracking” and its related risks and benefits. 
There are many organized opponents. However, industrial leaders 
and other groups have shown some quite solid support for uncon-
ventional gas development, not the least to keep Germany’s high 
tech industries and manufacturing internationally competitive.  
ExxonMobil recognized Germany as a great and important mar-
ket, although it has to face strong obstacles for its unconventional 
gas business. In recent years, the company has stepped up its com-
munication efforts to make elites and the public aware of the sig-
nificance of domestic natural gas production – conventional and 
unconventional.  
ExxonMobil has a market position to defend 
This seems very plausible. While Germany imports most of its 
gas and generates only twelve percent on its own, of the German 
domestic production, ExxonMobil has a share of nearly 70 per-
cent. As figure 1 shows, the firm is much bigger in output than 
competitors RWE-Dea, GdF Suez and BASF Wintershall – Exx-
onMobil is the largest natural gas producer and supplier in Ger-
many (see figure 1) (ExxonMobil Central Europe Holding GmbH, 
n.d.-a). The country’s dominant operative company in natural gas 
production is actually BEB Erdgas und Erdöl (BEB), headquar-
tered in Hannover, Lower Saxony; BEB, which is historically a 
true German firm going back to the 19th century, is a 50/50 joint 
venture of Shell and Esso (Exxon), but its facilities are all operated 
by a direct subsidiary of ExxonMobil (BEB, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 1: Supply of the German gas market 2012 (ExxonMobil 
Central Europe Holding GmbH, n.d.-b) 
 
German conventional gas reserves and production have contin-
uously decreased, despite relatively intensive technical attempts to 
improve output. For producers, the challenge is to replace old 
sources by new ones – and here, unconventional gas comes in. 
 “Fracking,” however, is a very old story in Germany. In the 
Northwestern state of Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen), the coun-
try’s center of gas production, hydraulic fracturings has been used 
for 50 years – counting some 300 “fracs” to improve conventional 
and tight gas drilling. Lower Saxony gave its last permission to 
“frack” in 2011. In fact, a significant share of domestic gas pro-
duction comes from “fracked” wells (including many of Exx-
onMobil’s), and, as the state’s mining authority emphasizes, not 
ever has environmental damage been recorded on any of these 
(Land Niedersachsen, 2013, p. 3).  
Hydraulic fracturing was a technology only discussed in spe-
cialist circles – with some exceptions. In 2006, when ExxonMobil 
opened a new gas reservoir through “fracking,” the firm even re-
ceived a high-profile “Germany – Land of Ideas” award for its feat 
of engineering, celebrated with hundreds of local dignitaries. In 
those days, before controversy started, “fracking” was a reason to 
party, not to protest (Müller, 2013).  
What is new in Germany is unconventional gas, not “fracking” 
as such. Yet, exploring for shale gas demands much greater vol-
umes of hydraulic fracturing in a larger industrial context, and nei-
ther German mining authorities nor scientists have experience 
with such projects. On the other hand, preliminary studies estimate 
that the 700 to 2,300 billion cubic metres are much greater than 
the old proven domestic reserves; to get realistic, reliable data, ex-
plorative drilling using “fracking” would be necessary (Land Nie-
dersachsen, 2013, p. 3).  
Since 2008, Exxon has begun to explore natural gas reserves in 
shale and coalbeds in the states of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-
Westphalia (ExxonMobil Central Europe Holding GmbH, n.d.-d). 
The main focus in Germany still lies on test and exploration drill-
ings. For Exxon, this means six drillings in shale have been real-
ized and three additional shale gas projects are planned in Lower 
Saxony (ExxonMobil Central Europe Holding GmbH, n.d.-c).  
The legal framework is extensive. It encompasses multiple Ger-
man authorities and laws which have to be consulted, such as the 
federal mining law (Bundesberggesetz, BbergG) in order to get a 
permission, state mining regulations, and various environmental 
regulations (e.g. water legislation) (ExxonMobil Central Europe 
Holding GmbH, n.d.-f). 
ExxonMobil has a national market position to defend. Locally, 
the firm has had a solid and positive reputation as a responsible, 
community-anchored employer in economically challenged re-
gions of the rural, less populated and less industrialized North-
west. ExxonMobil was the quintessential corporate citizen, a gen-
erous charitable neighbor who helped small towns to finance a fire 
truck or a childrens’ therapy center when they needed it. The gas 
boom was a great time for the municipalities, also because they 
cashed in. The firm was a welcome taxpayer: In the state of Lower 
Saxony alone, it not only paid tax to federal and state authorities 
but to up to 80 local governments, who lived quite happily with 
the rigs that ExxonMobil put up to drill (Müller, 2013).  
But then, the shale gas controversy hit Germany – with much 
credit going to German media picking up the dramatic messages 
of the U.S. film, Gasland. In many places public opinion capsized 
“with remarkable speed,” as the conservative national daily 
Frankfurter Allgemeine noted: Local politicians and dignitaries 
disassociated themselves from the firm. They suddenly refused 
gifts in the name of Corporate Social Responsibility, and, under 
pressure from new anti-fracking groups, began to draft resolutions 
against their former benefactor in local councils (Müller, 2013).  
In the national arena, ExxonMobil has experienced an even 
more negative and politicized backlash in recent years as the most 
prominent target for environmental groups and new grassroots in-
itiatives, such as the “Gegen-Gasbohren” network. Media report-
ing about failing and faulty drilling and accidents, connected to 
unconventional gas or not, in Germany or abroad, fed the smol-
dering fire (NDR, 2011; Krüger, 2011; Panorama, 2011).  
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A new approach: campaign for acceptance 
ExxonMobil’s managers recognized they had a problem on their 
hands. The company has responded with broad, numerous com-
munication initiatives. Exxon is not afraid or shy to communicate 
its activities in the public and it also wants to solve arising prob-
lems openly. ExxonMobil representatives spend considerable time 
in local hearings and citizen forums, where they sometimes face 
aggressive questioning and reproachful comments (Klemp, 2010; 
Meier, 2010; n.a., 2011a). 
It has initiated an advertising campaign, taking out full-page ads 
in leading daily and weekly newspapers and magazines, and has 
run a television campaign, with 30-second spots directly placed 
before Germany’s most popular nightly news, “Tagesschau”.  
These spots – just like various other media – prominently fea-
ture Exxon employees (mostly engineers) as testimonials; they not 
only promoted the potential of Germany’s domestic gas supply but 
also, in a serious tone, address public concerns. They used words 
like future, environmental friendliness or safe and responsible. 
Needless to say, this advertising provoked a stir among critical 
bloggers and social media users, trying to counter the corporate 
messages with commentary and analysis that the firm offers “un-
conventional half-truths” (n.a., 2011c). 
 
      
 
 
Figure 2: Samples of German ExxonMobil media – brochure co-
vers and TV spot with employee testimonial on a special-interest 
website, erdgassuche-in-deutschland.de 
 
The company has coined clever slogans, used in various media 
and in press interviews, such as “Germany needs natural gas, and 
Germany has natural gas.” The message is simple but effective – 
we have it, so let’s go get it (ExxonMobil Central Europe Holding 
GmbH, n.d.-a; von Petersdorff, 2013).  
Apart from a German-language version of its European website 
(europaunkonventionelleserdgas.de), the firm’s Hamburg-based 
Public and Government Affairs department, aided by a press 
spokesman in Hannover, also runs a website dedicated to “the 
search for natural gas in Germany” (erdgassuche-in-deutsch-
land.de). With some extension to other electronic channels 
(YouTube, Twitter), Exxon supplies plenty of online materials, 
photos, graphic charts, fact sheets, data and brochures (“Domestic 
gas production: myth and reality”); it also invites users for inter-
active blogging in an opinion section. A continuous flow of news 
about even detailed works on gas sites comes out of the news sec-
tion, and press “canards” with incorrect information are responded 
to regularly.While these media channels and messages might still 
be considered quite conventional, ExxonMobil also committed se-
rious resources to an extensive and openly publicized participatory 
stakeholder consultation process, combined with a “neutral” risk 
assessment of hydraulic fracturing. As was reported, the company 
committed about one million euros to the innovative effort 
(Tenbrock, 2011).  
There were no flashy ads and marketing-styled communica-
tions; instead, it took a decidedly down-to-earth, earnest path in 
three segments – “Wissen und Forschen,” knowledge and science, 
„Reden und Einfluss nehmen,“ speaking and influencing, and 
“Fragen und Kommentieren,” questioning and commenting.  
This setup had a lengthy formal title: “Informations- und Di-
alogprozess der ExxonMobil über die Sicherheit und Umweltver-
träglichkeit der Fracking-Technologie für die Erdgasgewinnung,“ 
or in English: information and dialogue process by ExxonMobil 
about safety and environmental compatibility of the fracking tech-
nology for natural gas extraction. 
This internationally unique tool started in April 2011 and was 
operative until April 2012, with subsequent communications con-
tinuing. ExxonMobil representatives continually observed the pro-
cess but, for the most part, stood out of the way. Some company 
engineers and scientists answered firm-specific questions, and at 
the opening and end, ExxonMobil Europe CEO Gernot Kalkoffen 
spoke some friendly words, but overall the firm took a low profile, 
avoiding criticism it was steering the process. 
The “info-dialogue’s” basic credibility-enhancing element was 
the concept of an independent and neutral panel of experts from 
different disciplines, formed to investigate potential risks for a fi-
nal report. Obviously, the neutrality of the experts would be ques-
tioned. ExxonMobil only selected experts that had never before 
worked for the firm or the natural gas industry.  
Their efforts would also be put under scientific peer review. 
Their work was public and was observed with a critical eye from 
a working group consisting of various social actors including com-
munity leaders, water utility representatives, farmers’ associa-
tions, citizen groups and even clerics and religious community 
representatives. They were to work with the experts, collecting 
and formulating questions which the scientists would try to answer 
and later debate with the other stakeholders.  
The whole process was documented on a website, dialog-
erdgasundfrac.de (see screenshot, figure 3), and facilitated by pro-
fessional moderators from an Osnabrück consultancy specializing 
in citizen dialogues (Ewen, Borchardt, Richter & Hammerbacher, 
2012). 
In April 2012, the expert panel presented its comprehensive risk 
assessment in a large public conference. This completed the 
twelve-month “info-dialogue”. The experts did not see any objec-
tive reasons to totally ban exploration and production of uncon-
ventional gas using hydraulic fracturing.  
Their final report, however, included elaborate recommenda-
tions and warnings: there are major and minor risks, including 
threats to water; the extraction of unconventional gas leads to more 
emissions than that of conventional gas; “frac” fluids should be 
used without certain dangerous chemcials; “fracking” should not 
be applied in at-risk territory; some laws should be changed to be 
more restrictive; more science must be generated; and in any case, 
all projects should undergo extensive stakeholder consultations 
and planning procedures. The scientists clearly said: proceed with 
high caution, not everywhere and not under all circumstances 
(ExxonMobil Central Europe Holding GmbH, n.d.-i). 
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The firm documented the whole process and had its representa-
tives present it at various events. But it framed it, as could be ex-
pected, in all-positive terms. News media generally reported in a 
friendly way, particularly local and regional newspapers and 
broadcasting. But since all was public, many critical voices echoed 
across media and the Internet. For example, since ExxonMobil 
paid for the complex and costly procedure, questions came up how 
independent the work of the panel of nearly 40 scientist really was 
and whether Exxon influenced them, perhaps indirectly. Experts 
and the company did not disclose how much the scientists and their 
reviewers were paid. So this left room for speculation. Beyond 
such details, some of course put a question mark behind the inten-
tions and purposes of the total exercise. 
 
 
Figure 3: Website dialog-erdgasundfrac.de 
 
In one harshly critical report, the left-leaning, green-minded 
Berlin national daily newspaper taz debunked the “pseudo-dia-
logue” as “cosmetic” and “manipulative.” The process was meant 
to give new legitimacy to ExxonMobil’s operations, now enjoying 
the blessing of serious scientists. It created an “illusion” of equal-
ity when small-town mayors and simple farmers conversed with 
eminent researchers or mighty corporate leaders. The taz pointed 
out that discussion topics were systematically limited to “frack-
ing;” it was not an arena to debate energy policy, how fossil fuels 
competed with renewables, or whether that gas was really needed, 
or who makes a profit from continuing to produce and consume 
gas. Fundamental questions about power in society were not on 
the table: neither the pre-democratic principles behind Germany’s 
mining laws which gives priority to resource extraction, not ecol-
ogy or citizen participation, nor the power of corporate lobbyists 
setting the stage for the public agenda (Seyfert, 2012).  
Nevertheless, the one-year process which saw ExxonMobil pay 
scientists to publicly write up a long list of no-go areas and busi-
ness-restricting recommendations impressed even some of the 
most vocal critics. As one astounded senior policy analyst from 
the U.S. Natural Resource Defense Fund, a well-organized anti-
fracking green organization, said: “Can anyone imagine Exx-
onMobil funding a similar project in the U.S.?” (Mall, 2012).  
ExxonMobil also tried to win over skeptics with substantial 
commitments. Not only does the firm support full disclosure of 
chemicals used in the hydraulic fracturing process, in one 2012 
interview with business magazine WirtschaftsWoche, ExxonMo-
bil Europe CEO Gernot Kalkoffen announced that his firm would 
reduce the percentage of potentially dangerous or toxic chemicals 
in the fluids to zero by 2013 (Dürand & Matthes, 2012).  
At the moment, exploration is on hold. As a de facto moratorium 
had interrupted work, it is still unclear what the federal and state 
governments will change in the legislative and regulatory frame-
work. ExxonMobil has committed to educational efforts and to be 
open and communicative about public acceptance problems to 
safeguard its investments, as the firm does not want to lose its 
dominating position in the German upstream gas market.  
So far, the outcome is uncertain, but ExxonMobil has set a new 
standard for itself and the industry which diverges greatly from 
what it has undertaken in Poland or in any other country.  
Conclusion  
ExxonMobil showed impressively different approaches in Po-
land and Germany. They offer quite different business environ-
ments. At first view, Poland’s seemed so much more promising 
and supportive, and an easy context to pursue unconventional gas 
opportunities. The firm’s exit from Poland was a shock for the 
country and the government which had placed great hopes on for-
eign investors. Perhaps the new deal with Russia for tight oil in 
Siberia was a good reason to reshuffle priorities in the face of dis-
appointing test runs in Poland.  
Maybe the company, and also the Polish government handing 
out concessions, was a little too naïve to think that it would be 
possible to quickly find commercialization of Polish reserves. This 
case shows that even if a government strongly comes out in favor 
and creates a good environment for companies like Exxon, this 
cannot guarantee success when other technical and business deci-
sions are more important. Poland may have looked like a “fracking 
heaven” (Economist, 2013) but to some extent the country was not 
ready to deal with all the new challenges. 
In Germany, ExxonMobil found a much more uncomfortable 
environment. Yet there were also some unique advantages for the 
firm as a dominant and well-established player in domestic con-
ventional gas production. ExxonMobil’s upstream gas business in 
Germany has a 100-year-old history. The contrast could not be 
greater: ExxonMobil was a newcomer to Poland’s rush for gas, 
one competitor among many. It did not lose much when it quit the 
quest for the prize. Germany is a difficult place, too, but the non-
technical risk may in the end prove manageable, as the company 
has political leverage and the will to fight in familiar territory. 
ExxonMobil might have had some reasons to quit Germany’s 
unconventional gas base, as it had done in Poland. But one should 
keep in mind that the firm saw Germany to be more likely to be-
come a shale gas producer than Poland (Bergin, 2012).  
When the German public, at various levels, turned hostile, it 
pushed ExxonMobil to a new approach. Instead of giving up, the 
company developed ideas to provide a higher level of transpar-
ency, to work with information and argumentation to educate the 
public, and make concessions to the greater political demand for 
responsible operations. ExxonMobil fell far from erasing all 
doubts, of course, and this could hardly work within a short period, 
or in the face of a strong green movement which is generally 
against continuing and growing use of fossil fuels, domestic or 
elsewhere. Governments in Germany have made no effort to make 
it easier to operate unconventional gas facilities; quite the con-
trary. More regulation is on the way, but ExxonMobil has tried to 
show that it is part of the solution rather than part of the problem.  
Given that the German governments and political parties are 
anxious to develop renewable energies as a high priority, Exx-
onMobil could never have expected a fossil fuel enthusiasm as has 
been found in Poland. But that was always clear. On the other 
hand, the “Energiewende” debate has opened up opportunities to 
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talk about domestic supply as a matter of high national and eco-
nomic concern. That, at least, is something that Poland and Ger-
many have in common.  
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